Thailand, international human rights and
ISOC
The Thai army’s harsh treatment of Burmese
boat people raises important issues about
human rights in Thailand.
Thailand’s
human rights record has not been impressive, not only on the part of the
military but also the government policy itself. At a broader level, the Thai
government has not been a party to the
Geneva Convention of 1951, and it is reluctant
to ratify any international agreement related to
human rights issues.
Thai
security agencies do not seem to be comfortable with adopting international
standards as they are regarded as a way in which their actions could be
circumscribed, hence putting Thailand’s security in danger. However, with increasing
international pressure on human rights issues, Thailand tends to accept some
human
rights practices but not every aspect. So, in short, by not accepting international
legal frameworks, Thailand is able to apply the practices only on a minimal basis and
often slips away from that as long as its violations are not monitored or reported by
the media or NGOs.
The violation of the human rights of refugees and immigrants can be seen throughout
the country. For example, Thailand’s
Ministry of Interior always discourages and even
bans foreign workers from organising their own traditional festivals such as during
songkran. It has been reported that the authorities are afraid of any political
campaign or propaganda against Rangoon that may take place. So, if Burmese refugee or
migrant groups are allowed to hold festivals, the Thai police monitor them closely.
Mistreatments are also found in the Thai government’s management of Burmese
refugee
camps along the Thai-Burmese border. Camps’ sanitation and proper basic living
standards are always an issue between NGOs, international organisations and the Thai
government. Everything has to be negotiated instead of applying the basic and proper
measures that would be expected if Thailand accepted the international law. This also
brings about corruption, as some government officials from both the army and the
Ministry of Interior see such negotiations as a way to obtain financial benefits,
especially at the operational level.
However, the recent Rohingya refugee incident is very surprising. Although the army
may not apply a high standard of treatment in relation to Burmese refugees, they are
generally not so inhumane. I think, perhaps, there are several reasons for the Navy
and ISOC officers’ misconduct this time, compared to the
refugee camps in the north.
First, there are a lot of refugee camps and NGO operations in the north and they have
been there for many years. So, you can expect the security officers to be familiar
with international pressure and monitoring. This learning process may help them
exercise more caution on their own policy and implementation and mitigate some
problems. However, these Rohingya migratory flows are seasonal, especially in the dry
season as the sea is calmer. So, there are no permanent camps or NGO offices to help
them in a regular basis.
Second, it seems from media reports that all of the boat people involved in these
incidents are Muslim male. The security officers may have been too wary of them
having some links to unrest in Thailand’s south. Perhaps security paranoia was
heightened in the context of the recent
Mumbai bombings.
Third, the security officers may have been trying to demonstrate to the boat people
that they should not come through Thailand any more. In general, these Rohingya
refugees go to
Malaysia through Thailand. The agents that arrange their passage have
told them that Thailand is a safe place to land and proceed to Malaysia. So, this
time the harsh action may have been designed to send a clear message that they should
not land in Thailand.
Another issue is the question of why ISOC is involved in this kind of operation. It
needs to be seen in the context in which ISOC responsibilities have evolved. Although
ISOC was set up as an anti-communist measure during the
Cold War, it was revamped
several times.
First, during mid-1980s ISOC’s mission was adjusted to be more supportive to the main
operation of the army and the police instead of having their own independent roles.
This reflected the decrease in Cold War tension.
Second, ISOC was revamped again under the Chuan government. As the communist threat
was no longer visible, ISOC was assigned to support other non-traditional security
operations, which included border security and illegal migration.
Third, in 2001 during the Thaksin government, ISOC’s role was reduced considerably
especially in the management of problems in the southern provinces. Its role became
merely a co-ordinating body and civilian officials were also part of the ISOC
structure. For example, the deputy of ISOC used to be only the Supreme Commander in
Chief but this was changed to include a permanent-secretary from the
Ministry of
Interior and another
political affairs position.
Recently, the ISOC was empowered by the
September 2006 coup and the interim National
Assembly during the Surayud government, via the
Internal Security Act (ISA) 2008. The
implementation of ISA is not subject to any legal restriction that may be brought
against ISOC officers in the Administrative Court. So, with broader responsibilities
and power under the ISA of 2008 you may see how ISOC came to be involved in this
incident